Accounting for Fertility Decline During the Transition to Growth by Matthias Doepke
Accounting for Fertility Decline





In every developed country, the economic transition from pre-industrial stagna-
tion to modern growth was accompanied by a demographic transition from high to
low fertility. Even though the overall pattern is repeated, there are large cross-country
variations in the timing and speed of the demographic transition. What accounts for
falling fertilityduringthetransitiontogrowth? Toanswerthisquestion,thispaperde-
velops a uniﬁed growth model which delivers a transition from stagnation to growth,
accompanied by declining fertility. The model is used to determine whether gov-
ernment policies that affect the opportunity cost of education can account for cross-
country variations in fertility decline. Among the policies considered, education sub-
sidies have only minor effects, while accounting for child-labor regulations is crucial.
Apart from inﬂuencing fertility, the policies also have large effects on the evolution of
the income distribution in the course of development.
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Fertility decline is a universal feature of development. Every now industrialized country
experienced a demographic transition form high to low fertility, accompanied by a large
rise in life expectancy. Most developing countries are in the midst of their demographic
transition today. Until a short time ago, economic and demographic change during de-
velopment were studied in isolation: researchers studying economic growth tended to
abstract from population dynamics, while demographers concentrated on explanations
for the demographic transition. More recently, economists have started to recognize im-
portant interactions between demographic and economic change, and responded by de-
veloping uniﬁed models which encompass both the economic takeoff from stagnation to
growth, and the demographic transition from high to low fertility.
Accounting for fertility behavior is an important challenge for theories of development,
because demographic change affects the economic performance of a country in a number
of ways. The most familiar concern is that high population growth dilutes the stock of
physical capital, and therefore exerts a negative effect on income per capita. A perhaps
even more important channel works through the accumulation of human capital. High
fertility rates tend to be associated with low education; countries with a high fertility
rate therefore accumulate less human capital. A third channel from the demographic
transition to growth works through changes in the age structure of the population. Rapid
fertility decline lowers the dependencyratio, since initially both the old-age and child-age
cohorts are small relative to the working-age population. Hence, countries that undergo a
fast fertility transition experience a sizable, if temporary, boost to their level of output per
capita, because the size of the labor force increases faster than the population as a whole.1
The focus of this paper is to understand why different countries undergo different demo-
graphic transitions. Despite the fact that the overall pattern is repeated, the speed and
timing of fertility decline during the transition from stagnation to growth differs widely
across countries. An example that will be used repeatedly throughout the paper is the
contrast of Brazil and South Korea. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the two countries had
a very similar growth experience. Substantial growth in income per capita started at the
same time, and throughout the late 1960s and 1970s both countries were considered to be
“miracle economies,” with growth rates of output per capita exceeding ﬁve percent per
1Bloom and Williamson (1998) argue that this cohort effect accounts for a large proportion of East Asia’s
“economic miracle” between 1960 and 1990.
1year. Initially, fertility was similar as well, with a total fertility rate of 6.0 in both countries
in 1960. After 1960, however, fertility started to drop fast in Korea, while fertility decline
was much slower and more spread out in Brazil. Figure 1 plots the total fertility rate
relative to GDP per capita. As a benchmark, data from England, the ﬁrst country to expe-
rience the transition from stagnation to growth, is also included in the graph. Relative to
income per capita, fertility fell much faster in Korea than it had in England, whereas the
decline is much slower in Brazil. Throughout most of the transition, for a given level of
income per capita the fertility differential between Brazil and Korea exceeds two children
per family.2
Why did the demographic transition proceed so much faster in Korea than in Brazil?
Existing theories of growth and fertility decline do not answer this question, since they
imply that fertility is a ﬁxed function of income per capita during the transition, so that
the fertility transition should be identical across countries. The aim of this paper is to
explore the role of one speciﬁc explanation, namely differences in educational and child-
labor policies, in explaining cross-country variations in the speed of fertility decline.3
The motivation for this explanation is twofold. First, most economic models of fertil-
ity choice are built on the notion of a quantity-quality tradeoff between the number of
children and education per child (for example, Becker and Barro 1988). If fertility and ed-
ucation are indeed joint decisions, government policies that affect the opportunity cost of
education should have a ﬁrst-order effect on fertility. Second, we do in fact observe large
variations in educational and child-labor policies across countries during the transition to
growth. Most countries introduce education and child-labor reforms at some point dur-
ing their development, but the extent and timing of these reforms varies widely. Brazil
and Korea are once again drastic examples. Starting in the mid-ﬁfties (after the Korean
war), the two countries were polar opposites in terms of their educational and child la-
bor policies. In Korea, child labor was almost completely eradicated by 1960, and large
amounts of resources were devoted to building a public education system. In terms of
educational outcomes (enrollment rates, literacy rates, average schooling) Korea was far
ahead of other countries at a comparable level of development. Brazil, on the other hand,
spent relatively little on basic education, and was lagging far behind comparable coun-
2Similar variations in the speed of fertility decline can be observed across many other countries. The
transition was especially rapid in the East Asian “miracle” economies such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore. Examples of a slow transition include Malaysia, Turkey, Mexico, and Costa Rica.
3In concentrating on the role of political variables, I abstract from other factors that could also affect the
fertility transition. The aim here is to derive the implications of differenteducational policies on the fertility
transition in isolation; the analysis does not rule out that other factors could also matter.
2tries in terms of educational outcomes. Child labor laws were lax and loosely enforced,
so that child labor was widespread well into the 1990s.4
In order to examine the role of educational policies during the fertility transition, I de-
velop a growth model that generates a phase of Malthusian stagnation combined with
high fertility, followed by a transition to a growth regime and low fertility. The model is
used to explore the degree to which child-labor restrictions and education subsidies can
account for cross-country variations in the timing and the speed of fertility decline. The
theoretical framework consists of three key elements: An agricultural production func-
tion, an industrial production function, and a quantity-quality fertility model. The main
role of the technology side of the model, which derives from Hansen and Prescott (2002),
is to generate an economic transition from stagnation to growth. The preference side of
the model is based on the dynastic utility framework introduced by Becker and Barro
(1988). Parents are altruistic and decide on the number and on the education level of their
children, i.e., they face a quantity-quality tradeoff. This tradeoff is essential for generating
fertility decline during the transition to growth.
To assess whether the effects of government policies are quantitatively important, the
model is calibrated to data. By simulating the calibrated model under different policy
regimes, I examine how educational and child labor policies affect the fertility transition.
The main ﬁnding is that these policies indeed have large effects on fertility during the
transition to growth. If parents have to pay for schooling and child labor is unrestricted,
the fertility transition starts later and progresses slowly. In contrast, if education is pub-
licly provided and restrictions on child labor are strict, fertility declines rapidly. Quantita-
tively, education subsidies have a relatively minor impact, but accounting for child-labor
restrictions turns out to be crucial.
I also examine what happens if the same policy reforms that were instituted at the start
of the take-off in Korea are introduced with a delay. This “English” regime is designed to
capture the fact that in England industrialization started before 1800, whereas the main
policychangeswere only introduced after about1870. In the model, with a delayedpolicy
reform fertility stays high in the early phase of the transition, and declines rapidly once
the reforms are introduced. This pattern is consistent with the evolution of fertility in
England between 1800 and 1914. The timing of the education reform also has large effects
on the income distribution. If the reform takes place at the start of the transition, inequal-
ity stays low throughout the transition. With a delayed reform, a Kuznets curve emerges:
4See Appendix C for a description of educational policies and outcomes in Brazil and Korea.
3inequality ﬁrst increases rapidly, and then decreases once the policies are changed.
This research adds to an emerging literature on long-run growth and population dy-
namics. Galor and Weil (2000), K¨ ogel and Prskawetz (2001), Jones (2001), Hansen and
Prescott (2002), and Tamura (2002) all develop models that generate a transition from
pre-industrial stagnation to modern growth, accompanied by a demographic transition.
To the extent that fertility is endogenous, these models also have the feature that a rise
in the return to human capital is the driving force behind fertility decline.5 However, the
models imply fertility is a ﬁxed function of income per capita during the transition to
growth, which is inconsistent with cross-country variations in fertility decline.
Relative to the existing literature, the main contribution of this paperis to develop a quan-
titative model of the transition from stagnation to growth which can be used to under-
stand cross-country differencesin the transition experience.6 Apart from being interesting
in its own right, addressing cross-country differences also serves as a test of the theory:
if we ﬁnd the true mechanism that explains the fertility decline associated with develop-
ment, we should also be able to explain why the fertility decline differed so much across
countries. To this end, the results in this paper lend support to the quality-quantity model
of fertility choice in general.
The results also provide a new perspective on the growth-and-inequality debate. The
same policies that inﬂuence fertility choice in the model also have large effects on the
evolution of the income distribution during the transition. The main driving force be-
hind the distributional effects is the endogenous fertility differential between skilled and
unskilled parents. Through this differential, educational policies have large long-run ef-
fects on the relative number of skilled and unskilled people, and therefore on the skill
premium.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model.
Section 3 derives a number of theoretical properties of the model, and Section 4 discusses
5Alternativetheoriesarebasedonchangesingenderroles, seeGalorandWeil(1996)andLagerl¨ of(2002),
and the old-age security motive, see Morand (1999).
6Other recent studies which use quantitative theory to evaluate growth models with endogenous popu-
lation include Fern´ andez-Villaverde(2001)on the role of capital-skill complementarity for explaining fertil-
ity decline, Greenwood and Seshadri(2002)on the U.S.demographic transition, and Ngai(2000)on barriers
to technology adoption.
7Fertility differentials play an important role in Moav (2001), who points to cross-country fertility dif-
ferences as an explanation for persistent income inequality, and de la Croix and Doepke (2003), who link
fertility differentials within a country to economic growth. Interactions between fertility differentials and
inequality are also the focus of Dahan and Tsiddon (1998), Kremer and Chen (1999), and Veloso (1999).
4the behavior of the model in the Malthusian regime, the growth regime, and the transition
between the two. In Section 5 I discuss the calibration procedure, and Section 6 uses
the calibrated model to assess the effect of government policies during the transition.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of people who live for two pe-
riods, childhood and adulthood. Children receive education or work, do not enjoy any
utility, and do not get to decide anything. Adults can be either skilled or unskilled, de-
pending on their education. In each period there is a continuum of adults of each type;
NS is the measure of skilled adults, and NU is the measure of unskilled adults. Adults
decide on their consumption, labor supply, and on the number and the education of their
children.
Technology
The single consumption good in this economy can be produced with two different meth-
ods. There is an agricultural technology that uses skilled labor, unskilled labor, and land
as inputs, and an industrial technology that only uses the two types of labor. Production
in each sector is carried out by competitive ﬁrms. The main task of the technology setup
is to deliver an industrial revolution from stagnation to growth: the takeoff takes place
once the industrial technology becomes sufﬁciently productive to be introduced along-
side agriculture.
The ﬁrm-level industrial production function exhibits constant returns to scale, and is
given by:
yI = AI (lS)
1−α (lU)
α, (1)
where yI is output (I stands for “Industry”), AI is a productivity parameter, lS and lU
are inputs of skilled and unskilled labor, and the parameter α satisﬁes 0 <α<1. Since
there are no externalities, aggregate industrial output is YI = AI (LIS)1−α (LIU)α,w h e r e
LIS and LIU are the aggregate amounts of skilled and unskilled labor employed in the
industrial sector. Since I want to abstract from bequests, there is no capital in the pro-
duction function. The setup is equivalent, however, to a model with capital under the
5small-open-economy assumption, which is the approach taken by Galor and Weil (2000).8
The agricultural sector uses the two types of labor and land. The aggregate agricultural
production function is given by:




Here YF is agricultural output (F stands for “Farm”), AF is a productivity parameter,
LFS and LFU are the aggregate amounts of skilled and unskilled labor employed in the
agricultural sector, and Z is the total amount of land. I assume that the parameters satisfy
θS,θ U > 0a n dθS + θU < 1.
To abstract from land ownership and bequests, I assume that land is a public good. From
the perspective of a small individual ﬁrm operating the agricultural technology, there are
constant returns to labor. However, since there is a limited amount of land, labor input by
one ﬁrm imposes a negative externality on all other ﬁrms. On the level of an individual
ﬁrm, for given labor inputs lS and lU of skilled and unskilled labor output yF is given by:













Thus the total amount of labor employed has a negative effect on the productivity of an
individual ﬁrm. The speciﬁc form of the external effect was chosen such that the individ-
ual production functions (3) aggregate to (2) above. As far as the analysis in this paper is
concerned, the main feature of the agricultural production function is decreasing returns
to labor. The assumption of decreasing returns is essential for generating the Malthusian
regime.9 I assume that the industrial sector is more skill-intensive than the agricultural
8Speciﬁcally, if the industrial production function is y = B [(lS)1−α(lU)α]1−aka and the ﬁxed return on
capital k is given by r, capital adjusts such that its marginal product is equal to r. Solving that condition for













1−a. The same argument applies to the agricultural production
function.
9The assumption of an external effect from labor, on the other hand, is not essential, and is used only to
abstract from land ownership. The model is equivalent to a setup in which all land is owned by foreigners
or a separate land-owning class.
6sector:
Assumption 1 The industrial sector is more skill-intensive, i.e., the production function param-
eters satisfy α<θ U, which implies 1 − α>θ S.
This assumption will be important for generating fertility decline during the transition






I = γIAI, (4)
where γF,γ I > 1. The assumption of exogenous and constant productivity growth is
made to emphasize that the speciﬁc source of productivity improvements does not matter
for the qualitative results of the model; it is only necessary that productivity growth takes
place at all. Neither is it necessary to assume a change in the rate of productivity growth
to explain the switch from stagnation to growth. Exogenous productivity growth allows
us to apply the model equally to countries at the technology frontier (such as England in
the 19th century) and to countries which mostly adopt existing technology (such as Korea
and Brazil in the 20th century).
The state vector x in this economy consists of the productivity levels AF and AI in the
agricultural and industrial sectors, and the measures NS and NU of skilled and unskilled
adults: x ≡{ AF,A I,N S,N U} The only restriction on the state vector is that it has to




In equilibrium, wages are a function of the state. It will be shown in Proposition 1 below
that ﬁrms will always be operating in the agricultural sector, while the industrial sector
is only operated if the wages satisfy the condition wS(x)1−α wU(x)α ≤ AI (1 − α)1−α αα.
The problem of a ﬁrm in sector j,w h e r ej ∈{ F,I}, is to maximize proﬁts subject to
the production function, taking wages as given. Proﬁt maximization implies that wages
equal marginal products in each sector. Writing labor demand as a function of the state,













7If the industrial sector is operating, wages have to equal marginal products as well:











if LIS(x),L IU(x) > 0. (8)
Instead of writing out the ﬁrms’ problem in the deﬁnition of an equilibrium below, I will
impose (5)–(8) as equilibrium conditions.
Preferences and Policies
I will now turn to the decision problem of the adults. Adults care about consumption
and the number and utility of their children. The preference structure is an extension
of Becker and Barro (1988) to the case of different types of children. The main objective
of the preference setup is to generate a quantity-quality tradeoff between the number of
children and education per child. This tradeoff isessential for educational and child-labor
policies to have an effect.
Adults discount the utility of their children, and the discount factor is decreasing in the
number of children. In other words, the more children an adult already has, the smaller
is the additional utility from another child. The utility of an adult who consumes c units
of the consumption good and has nS skilled and nU unskilled children is given by:
c






and I assume 0 <β<1, 0 <σ<1, and 0 < <1. V  
S is the utility skilled children will
enjoy as adults, and V  
U is the utility of unskilled children, both foreseen perfectly by the
parent. The parameter σ determines the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption,
β is the general level of altruism, and   is the elasticity of altruism with respect to the
number of children. The utilities V  
S and V  
U are outside of the control of parents and are
therefore taken as given. The utility of children depends on the aggregate state vector in
the next period, and since there is a continuum of people, aggregates cannot be inﬂuenced
by any ﬁnite number of people.
Adults are endowed with one unit of time, and they allocate their time between working
andchild-raising. Children arecostly, both in terms ofgoods andin termsof time. Raising
each child takes ρ>0 units of the consumption good and a fraction φ>0 of the total
8time available to an adult. Adults also have to decide on the education of their children.
Children need a skilled teacher to become skilled. It takes a fraction φS of a skilled adult’s
time to teach one child. Therefore, if parents want skilled children, they have to send
their children to school and pay the skilled teacher. Children who do not go to school
stay unskilled and work during childhood. Children can perform only the unskilled task,
and one working child supplies φU units of unskilled labor. The parameter φU is smaller
than one since children do not work from birth on, and since they are not as productive
as adults. I also assume φU <φ , so that even after accounting for child labor there is still
a net cost associated with having unskilled children.
There are two government policies in the model, a child-labor restriction and an educa-
tion subsidy. With these policies, the government can inﬂuence both components of the
opportunity cost of education for a child: the value of a child’s time in terms of child
labor, and the direct schooling cost. A child-labor restriction amounts to lowering the pa-
rameter φU. The government chooses a function φU(·) which determines how much time
children work, depending on the state. Since restrictions can only lower the legal amount
of child labor, I require 0 ≤ φU(x) ≤ φU for all x.10 The government also has the option of
subsidizing a ﬁxed amount of the schooling cost for all children at school. This expendi-
ture is ﬁnanced with a ﬂat income tax, and budget balance is observed in every period.
The government chooses a function δ that determines the fraction of the schooling cost to
be paid by the government, where 0 ≤ δ(x) ≤ 1f o ra l lx. Contingent on this function, the
ﬂat tax τ is chosen to observe budget balance.
With taxes and the subsidy, the budget constraint of an adult of type i is given by:
c + ρ (nS + nU)+( 1− δ(x)) φSwS(x) nS
≤ (1 − τ(x)) [(1 − φ(nS + nU))wi(x)+φU(x) wU(x) nU]. (9)
The right-hand side is after-tax income of the adult plus the income from sending un-
skilled children to work. Notice that the time cost φ for each child has to be subtracted
from the time endowment to compute labor supply. On the left-hand side are consump-
tion, the goods cost for each child, and the part of the education cost for the skilled chil-
dren that is paid by the parents. For simplicity, adults are not restricted to choose integer
numbers of children. Also notice that there is no uncertainty in this model. Whether a
child becomes skilled does not depend on chance or unobserved abilities, but is under
10In the applications below, I will consider a one-time change in child labor policy.
9full control of the parent.
In equilibrium, the wages and the utilities of skilled and unskilled people are functions
of the state vector. The maximization problem of an adult of type i,w h e r ei ∈{ S,U},i s
described by the following Bellman equation:









subject to the budget constraint (9) and the equilibrium law of motion x  = g(x).
For the problem of a parent always to be well deﬁned, we have to place a joint restriction
on the parameters which ensures that the effective discount factor is not higher than one.
In other words, adults cannot place higher weight on the utility of their children than on
their own utility. Since the discount factor depends on the number of children, we have to
consider the highest possible number of children, which is reached by an unskilled adult
who spends all income on children. The resulting number of children is 1/(φ − φU).








Here (γI)σ is the growth rate of utility along the balanced growth path which is reached
after the switch to the industrial technology.
The fact that only parents, not children, make educational decisions leads to a market
imperfection. With perfect markets, children would be able to borrow funds to ﬁnance
their own education. In equilibrium, children would have to be indifferent between going
to school or not, so that net income of skilled and unskilled adults would be equalized.
Since there are no differences in ability or stochastic income shocks, the market imper-
fection is necessary to create inequality in this model. I also rule out the possibility that
parents write contracts that bind their children. Otherwise, parents could borrow funds
from richer adults, and have their children pay back the loan to the children of the lender.
It will be shown in Section 3 below that the adults’ problem has only corner solutions.
Adults either send all their children to school, or none of them; there are never both
skilled and unskilled children within the same family. It is possible, however, that adults
of a speciﬁc type are just indifferent between sending all their children to school or none.
10In that case, some parents of a given type might decide to have skilled children, while oth-
ers go for the unskilled variety. In equilibrium, the typical situation will be that all skilled
parents have skilled children, while there are both unskilled parents with unskilled chil-
dren and unskilled parents who send their children to school. In other words, there is
upward intergenerational mobility.
In the deﬁnition of an equilibrium I have to keep track of the fractions of adults of each
type who have skilled and unskilled children. The function λi→j(·) gives the fraction of
adults of type i who have children of type j, as a function of the state x. For each type of
parent and for all x ∈ X these fractions have to sum to one:
λS→S(x)+λS→U(x)=λU→S(x)+λU→U(x)=1 . (10)
The policy function nj(i,·) gives the number of children for i-type parents who have j-
type children as a function of the state.
The remaining equilibrium conditions are the labor-market clearing constraints, the bud-
get constraint of the government, and the laws of motion for the number of skilled and
unskilled adults. These constraints and a formal deﬁnition of an equilibrium are given in
Appendix A.
3 Analytical Results
This section derives a number of theoretical results that will be useful for describing the
equilibrium behavior of the model. First, I analyze the two production sectors, and then
I turn to the decision problem of an adult in the economy. All proofs are contained in the
appendix.
On the technology side the main result is that while the agricultural sector is always oper-
ating, industrial ﬁrms produce only if industrial productivity is sufﬁciently high relative
to wages. The following propositions derive the conditions that are necessary for produc-
tion in industry and agriculture.
Proposition 1 Firms will be operating in the industrial sector only if the skilled and unskilled
wages wS(x) and wU(x) satisfy the condition:
wS(x)
1−α wU(x)
α ≤ AI (1 − α)
1−α α
α. (11)
11In the agricultural sector, ﬁrms will be operating given any wages.
It is easy to check whether the industrial sector will be operated for a given supply of
skilled and unskilled labor. We can use conditions (5) and (6) to compute wages in agri-
culture under the assumption that there is agricultural production only. If the resulting
wages satisfy condition (11), the industrial technology is used. Skilled and unskilled la-
bor is allocated such that the wage for each skill is equalized across the two sectors. If
condition (11) is violated, production takes place in agriculture only.
In equilibrium, initially only the agricultural technology is used. Given that there is pos-
itive productivity growth in industry, at some point the industrial technology becomes
sufﬁciently productive to be introduced alongside agriculture, and an “industrial revolu-
tion” occurs. This behavior arises from an interaction between the properties of the two
production sectors and the population dynamics in the model. Since population is de-
termined by fertility decisions, I will now turn to the decision problem of an adult in the
model economy.
From the point of view of an adult, the utility of a potential skilled or unskilled child is
given by a number that cannot be inﬂuenced. There are no individual state variables,
and the utility of children is determined by fertility decisions in the aggregate, which
adults take as given since there is a continuum of people. This allows us to analyze
the decision problem of an adult without solving for a complete equilibrium ﬁrst. In
this section, we will analyze the decision problem of an adult who receives (after-tax)
wage w>0 and who knows that skilled children will receive utility VS > 0 in the next
period, whereas unskilled children can expect VU > 0. I restrict attention to positive
utilities, because if children receive zero utility, it is optimal not to have any children. In
order to keep notation simple, I will express the cost of children directly in terms of the
consumption good. The cost for a skilled child is pS, and the cost for an unskilled child
is denoted as pU. For example, without government policies we have pS = φw + φSwS + ρ
and pU = φw − φUwU + ρ. We always have pS >p U; skilled children are more expensive
than unskilled children.




(w − pSnS − pUnU)
σ + β(nS + nU)
− [nSVS + nUVU]

. (12)
An alternative way of formulating this problem is to imagine the adults as choosing the
total education cost E they spend on raising children and the fraction f of this cost that
12they spend on skilled children. The number of children is then given by nS = fE/pS and







1− (f/pS +( 1− f)/pU)
− [fVS/pS +( 1− f)VU/pU]

. (13)
The ﬁrst result is that the decision problem of an adult has only corner solutions:
Proposition 2 For any pair {E,f} that attains the maximum in (13) we have either f =0or
f =1 .
Adults choose either skilled or unskilled children, but never mix both types in one family.
W ec a ng a i ni n t u i t i o nf o rt h i sr e s ult by considering the model with   = 0 (which is ruled
out by assumption), in which case both the utility gained from having children and the
cost of children are linear in the numbers of the two types of children. If we have VS/pS =
VU/pU, the adult is indifferent between unskilled and skilled children and any convex
combination of the two types. However, if we now have  >0, as assumed, the term
(f/pS +( 1− f)/pU)−  in (13) becomes a convex function of f, and the adult will choose a
corner solution.
Given that there are only corner solutions,t h eo p t i m a ln u m b e ro fc h i l d r e nc a nb ed e -
termined by separately computing the optimal choices assuming that there are only un-
skilled or only skilled children. We can then compare which type yields higher utility.









The ﬁrst-order condition can be written as:
β(1 −  )(w − pini)
1−σVi = σpi(ni)
 . (14)
There is a unique positive ni solving this equation, and the second-order condition for a
maximum issatisﬁed given that we assume 0 <σ<1a n d0< <1. The optimal number
of children ni is increasing in the children’s utility Vi and in the wage w. Thus children are
a normal good in this model. On the other hand, if the cost of children pi is proportional
to the wage w, the optimal number of children decreases with the wage. Thus if the cost
of children is a pure time cost, the substitution effect outweighs the income effect.
13If an adult is indifferent between skilled and unskilled children, the total expenditure on
children does not depend on the type of the children.
Proposition 3 An adult is indifferent between skilled and unskilled children if and only if the





If an adult is indifferent, the total expenditure on children does not depend on the type of children
that is chosen.
Propositions 2and3haveimplicationsforintergenerationalmobilityinthe model. Propo-
sition 3 states that for given utilities of skilled and unskilled children the ratio of the
prices of skilled and unskilled children determines whether parents send their children
to school. As long as the wage for skilled labor is higher than the unskilled wage, skilled
children are relatively cheaper for skilled parents, since wS >w U implies:
φwS + φSwS + ρ
φwS − φUwU + ρ
<
φwU + φSwS + ρ
φwU − φUwU + ρ
.
The term on the left-hand side is the ratio of the prices for skilled and unskilled children
for skilled adults, and the right-hand side is the ratio for unskilled adults. The cost of
time is higher for skilled adults, because the skilled wage is higher than the unskilled
wage. Since the opportunity cost of child rearing makes up a larger fraction of the cost of
unskilled children, unskilled children are relatively more expensive for skilled parents.
Since the relative price of skilled and unskilled children differs for skilled and unskilled
parents, it cannot be the case that both types of adults are indifferent between the two
types of children at the same time. Since skilled children are relatively cheaper for skilled
parents, in equilibrium there are always skilled parents who have skilled children. Oth-
erwise, there would be no skilled children at all, which cannot happen in equilibrium.
Likewise, there are always unskilled adults with unskilled children.
Taking these facts together, exactly three situations can arise in any given period. The ﬁrst
possibility is that skilled parents strictly prefer skilled children, while unskilled parents
strictly prefer unskilled children. In that case, there is no intergenerational mobility. The
second possibility is that skilled parents are indifferent between the two types of children,
while all unskilled parents have unskilled children. The third option is that all skilled
14parents have skilled children, while the unskilled adults are indifferent between the two
types. This last case is the typical one along an equilibrium path, as will be explained
in more detail later. In this situation, there is upward intergenerational mobility, because
some unskilled adults have skilled children, but no downward mobility.
The following proposition sums up the implications of these results for an equilibrium.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, for any x ∈ X such that wS(x) >w U(x), the following must be
true:
• A positive fraction of skilled adults has skilled children, and a positive fraction of unskilled
adults has unskilled children:
λS→S(x),λ U→U(x) > 0.
• Just one type of adult can be indifferent between the two types of children:
λS→U(x) > 0 implies λU→S(x)=0 ,
λU→S(x) > 0 implies λS→U(x)=0 .


















4 Outline of the Behavior of the Model
Assuming that the economy starts at a time when productivity in industry is low com-
pared to agriculture, the economy evolves through three different regimes: The Malthu-
sian regime, the transition, and the growth regime. In the Malthusian regime the indus-
trial technology is too inefﬁcient to be used for some time. Therefore the model behaves
15like one in which there is an agricultural sector only. The economy displays Malthusian
features—wages stagnate, and population growth offsets any improvements in produc-
tivity.
There are three key features of the model that generate the Malthusian regime. First,
it is essential that children are a normal good. This property ensures that population
growth increases once improvements in technology lead to higher wages. The second
necessary assumption is that the agricultural technology exhibits decreasing returns to
the size of the labor force. This feature ensures that higher population growth depresses
wages, which pushes the economy back to the steady state. The third key assumption
is that there is a goods cost ρ for each child. Without this cost, it would be possible
that population growth stays ahead of productivity growth, and wages converge to zero.
Taken together, these features create a Malthusian feedback in which rising wages raise
population growth, but population growth depresses wages, resulting in a steady state in
which wages are constant.
The values for all variables in the Malthusian regime can be determined by solving a sys-
tem of steady-state equations under the assumption that only the agricultural technology
isused. For a wide range ofparameter choices, there is a solution to the steady-state equa-
tions in which both wages and the ratio of skilled to unskilled adults are constant11.I nt h e
steady state, average fertility is higher for unskilled adults. While all skilled adults send
their children to school, there are some unskilled parents with unskilled children and
others with skilled children. Wages depend on preference parameters and the growth
rate of agricultural productivity, but are independent of the level of productivity, since
productivity growth is exactly offset by population growth.
Even though only the agricultural production function is used in the Malthusian regime,
the productivity of the industrial technology is increasing over time. At some point, pro-
ductivity in industry reaches a level at which industrial production is proﬁtable at the
wages that prevail in the Malthusian regime. From that time on the industrial technol-
ogy will be used alongside the agricultural technology. Since population growth does not
depress wages in industry, wages and income per capita start to grow with productivity
in the industrial sector. While the model assumes that the growth rate of productivity in
industry is constant even before the technology is used, all that is necessary is that pro-
11If the schooling cost is very high, it is possible that no solution exists and the fraction of skilled adults
converges to zero. Also, if productivity growth and the cost of children are very high it is possible that
population growth is not high enough to offset productivity growth. Neither case arises in the calibrated
model.
16ductivity growth in industry is bounded away from zero. This is a natural assumption
since technology in industry and agriculture is complementary, in the sense that inven-
tions which are useful for agriculture also have industrial uses. For example, James Watt’s
contributions to the design of steam engines would not have been possible without prior
discoveries in mechanics and metallurgy that were originally aimed at improving agri-
cultural (and perhaps military) technology.
The evolution of fertility and the income distribution once the transition starts depends
on the speciﬁc properties of the industrial production function. Given Assumption 1 (pro-
duction in industry is more skill-intensive than production in agriculture), the introduc-
tion of the industrial technology increases the wage premium for skilled labor. This in-
creases the returns to education, so that more unskilled adults will choose to have skilled
children, resulting in higher social mobility. The overall effect on fertility is uncertain.
The increased demand for expensive skilled children would tend to lower fertility, but
then since wages start to grow, the utility of children relative to their parents increases,
which tends to increase fertility. The transition can be inﬂuenced bypublic policy. Both an
education subsidy and child-labor restrictions lower the relative cost of skilled children,
so that both policies have a positive effect on the number of children going to school.
The effects on fertility, however, are different. Since a subsidy lowers the cost of children,
an education subsidy tends to increase fertility, even though more children are going to
school. Child labor restrictions, on the other hand, increase the cost of children, and
therefore lead to lower fertility. The quantitative importance of public policies during the
transition will be assessed below.
If productivity growth in industry is sufﬁciently high, the fraction of output produced
in industry will increase over time, until the agricultural sector ultimately becomes neg-
ligible. The economy will then reach a balanced growth path, the growth regime. Here
the model behaves like one in which there is the industrial technology only. All variables
can be computed by solving a system of balanced-growth equations. Whether fertility is
higher in the growth regime than in the Malthusian regime is determined by the relative
importance of skill in the two technologies. If the industrial technology is sufﬁciently
skill-intensive, in the growth regime most children will go to school. Since schooling
is costly, this will tend to lower fertility and population growth. On the other hand, as
wages grow, the physical cost ρ of children ultimately becomes negligible. This effect
makes children relatively cheaper in the growth regime, which will tend to increase fertil-
ity. Unless the schooling cost is very high, the ratio of skilled to unskilled adults reaches
17a ﬁxed number in the growth regime.12 Population growth and fertility are constant,
and wages and consumption grow at the rate of technical progress. Average fertility is
lower for skilled than for unskilled adults. This would be true even if the schooling cost
were zero and if there were no child labor, since then the only remaining cost of children
would be a time cost. It was shown in Section 3 that if there is a pure time cost for having
children, wages and fertility are negatively related. With positive schooling cost and child
labor the relative cost of skilled children increases, and since relatively more skilled adults
have skilled children, this will further increase the fertility differential between the two
types of adults. Given that fertility is higher for unskilled adults in the balanced growth
path, it has to be the case that some unskilled adults have skilled children. Otherwise the
fraction of unskilled adults would increase over time. Therefore unskilled adults are just
indifferent between the two types of children.
In the limit-economy without agriculture wages are determined by the ratio of skilled to
unskilled labor supply. The only required state variables are therefore the ratio of skilled
and unskilled adults and the productivity level in industry. The setup can further be
simpliﬁed by noting that the period utility function is of the constant-elasticity form, and
that wages are linear in the productivity level. This results in value functions that are




This reduces the growth regime essentially to a one-dimensional system, with the ratio of
skilled to unskilled adults as the state variable.
I will now turn to the question whether public policy can have large effects during the
transition. In the following sections, I calibrate the model parameters, and simulate the
model under different assumptions on policies.
5 Calibration
In this section I describe the procedure for calibrating the model parameters. Since I
use the model to examine whether policy differences across countries can account for
different transition experiences, it would be counterproductive to choose parameters to
12If the schooling cost is too high, the number of skilled adults converges to zero over time.
18closely match data from one speciﬁc country. Rather, I choose parameters such that in the
growth regime the model matches certain features of modern industrialized countries,
while in the Malthusian regime the model resembles a pre-modern economy. For the
growth regime, I use current U.S. data, while for the pre-modern economy I rely mostly
on England, where the available data is of relatively high quality. Since the calibration
procedure pins down only the two ends of the time line, we can use the transition period
for testing the model.
I start by describing the parameter choices that are determined by features of the growth
regime. The parameter γI, the rate of technological progress in the industrial sector, de-
termines the growth rate of per-capita output in the growth regime. In the United States,
real GDP per capita increased on average by 1.9% per year in the period from 1960 to
1992. I therefore chose the yearly growth rate of productivity in the industrial sector to be
2%. Since a model period is 25 years, this gives a value for γI of 1.64.
Given that there are strict compulsory schooling laws and child-labor restrictions in the
U.S., the parameters for the growth regime are calibrated under the assumption that child
labor is ruled out. The schooling cost parameter φS determines the number of teachers
and the student-teacher ratio in the growth regime. According to the Digest of Educa-
tion Statistics (U.S. Department of Education, 1998), in the U.S. teachers on all levels of
education make up 1.5% of the American population, and there are about 16 students per
teacher. Since, unlike in the model, in the real world each teacher teaches more than one
generation of students, we cannotmatch both values atthe sametime. Ifthe ratioof teach-
ers to population is matched, class sizes would be too big, and if class size is matched,
there would be too many teachers. As a compromise, I chose φS to be 0.04, which results
in a class size of 21, and 1.7% of the population are teachers.13 The time cost φ was then
chosen to match the total expenditure on children in the United States, estimated for 1992
by Haveman and Wolfe (1995). According to their estimates, parental per-child expendi-
tures were $9,200 or about 38% of per capita GDP. I chose φ to be 0.155, which leads to
the same ratio of per-child expenditures to GDP per capita. Knowles (1999) calibrates the
same parameter to other estimates of the cost of children and arrives at a similar value of
0.15.
Using data from 1975, Jones (1982) ﬁnds that in Britain the difference in total fertility
between women with elementary education or less and women with secondary or higher
education is about 0.4, and the corresponding value for the U.S. is about 0.5. I chose the
13Variations of the model which match either statistic exactly lead to essentially the same outcomes.
19preference parameters σ,   and β to be consistent with a fertility differential of 0.5 between
skilledparentsandunskilledparentswhohaveunskilledchildren, andatotal fertilityrate
of 2.0, which matches current fertility in the United States. The choices σ =0 .5,   =0 .5,
and β =0 .132 are consistent with these observations.
According the Digest of Education Statistics, in 1994 total expenditures on education
were 7.3% of GDP, while public expenditures were 4.8%, or roughly two thirds of the
total. These numbers exclude expenditures by parents and students, like textbooks and
transportation. The government therefore pays for less than two thirds of all educational
expenditures. In the model, I chose the fraction δ of education cost paid for by the gov-
ernment to be 0.5.
The technology parameter α, the share of unskilled labor in the industrial production
function, mainly determines the ratio of skilled to unskilled people in the growth regime.
It is hard to match this ratio to data, since there are more than two skill levels in the real
world. If we deﬁne skill to mean completed high school, skilled people would make up
most of the population, since already today almost 90% of recent school cohorts satisfy
this criterion. On the other hand, if skilled means completed college education, the num-
ber of skilled people would drop below 30%. Since college education was rare in some
of the countries and time periods I am interested in, I chose a compromise with higher
weight on high school. The parameter α was chosen to be .22, which results in 75% of the
population in the growth regime to be skilled.
I now turn to the Malthusian regime. Most parameters are identical to the growth regime,
we only need to calibrate the agricultural technology and the child-labor parameter. The
parameter γF, the rate of technological progress in the agricultural sector, determines
fertility in the Malthusian regime. In Britain the total fertility rate was about 4.0 in 1700,
and values in other European countries were similar. The value γF =1 .32 yields this
fertility rate in the Malthusian regime. The ﬁxed cost for children ρ is a scale parameter
and can be chosen arbitrarily. I chose ρ = .001.
The child-labor parameter φU is hard to calibrate, since there is only limited evidence on
the extent of child labor before the industrial revolution. However, φU has to be chosen
sufﬁciently large to allow a Malthusian regime. If φU is small, population growth does
not catch up with technological progress, and per capita output grows already before
the introduction of the industrial technology. On the other hand, if φU is too large, the
number of skilled agents converges to zero after the industrial technology is introduced.
My choice of φU = .07 is in the middle ground and is consistent both with Malthusian
20stagnation and a growth regime with a positive fraction of skilled agents. Adjusting for
labor supply, this implies that nine children are equivalent to one unskilled worker. The
behavior of the model is sensitive to the choice of φU;b ym a k i n gφU large, we can increase
the effects of eliminating child labor. It is therefore important to ascertain that φU is not
unrealistically large. From the perspective of the parent, the key question is how much of
household income is contributed by children. Horrell and Humphries (1995) ﬁnd that in
a sample of working-class families in England around 1800 children contributed between
27% and 32% of household income, whereas in the model income from child labor makes
up only 25% of income in families with working children.
For the parameters of the agricultural technology, I chose θS = .1a n dθU = .5. With
these choices, the share of output going to land rents is 40%, and skilled adults make up
about 5% of the population in the Malthusian regime. A lower bound on the land share
can be derived from the English National Accounts for 1688 in Deane and Cole (1969).
At that time rents made up 27% of national income. Since some of the 34% of national
income going to non-rent property income and proﬁts are also derived from land, 30%
is a reasonable lower bound for the share of land. On the other hand, share-cropping
contracts typically allocated 50% of output to the land owner. Since not all of national
income was derived from agriculture, 50% is then an upper bound for the land share. My
choice lies in the middle between these bounds.
6 Computational Experiments
This section uses the calibrated model to determine whether policy changes can have
large effects during the transition. I simulate the model under three different assump-
tions on government policies, roughly corresponding to the cases of Brazil, Korea and
England mentioned earlier.14 In the stylized Brazilian policy, there is no policy reform.
Parents pay for education, and child labor is unrestricted. In the stylized Korean pol-
icy, the economy starts out with the same policies. Once the economy starts to leave the
Malthusian regime, however, there is an immediate switch to the policies that were the
basis for calibrating the growth regime. Under these policies, the government pays for
50% of the education cost for skilled children, and child labor is ruled out. While in the
14See Appendix C for a description of actual policies in these countries. The policies used in the sim-
ulations are not intended to be exact copies of real-world policies. Rather, I use stylized, one-time policy
changes to assess the role of educational policies in general. Especially for Brazil, the policy description in
the model is not “fair” for more recent years: support for education has increased in the last decades (and
fertility has been falling faster).
21Korean policy the reform takes place immediately once the industrial technology is in-
troduced, in the stylized English policy the same reforms are carried out with a delay of
three periods (or 75 years) after the beginning of the transition. All economies start from
identical conditions. The initial values for agricultural productivity and the number of
skilled and unskilled adults are chosen to start the economies in the Malthusian steady
state. The productivity in industry is chosen such that the transition starts two periods
after the start of the simulation. Apart from the different timing of policy reforms (no
reform under the Brazilian policy, immediate reform under the Korean policy, delayed
reform under the English policy), all simulations are identical.
The outcomes can be summarized as follows. The timing of policy reforms has a ma-
jor impact on the timing and speed of the fertility transition. Without a policy reform,
the decrease in fertility during the transition to growth is small. When a reform is intro-
duced, it causes an immediate drop in fertility, and the transition to replacement fertility
is completed within two generations after the reform. In addition, lowering the oppor-
tunity cost of education increases growth in GDP per capita, since the fraction of skilled
workers in the population increases. Out of the two policies considered, child-labor re-
strictions account for the bulk of the results, while the effects of education subsidies are
comparatively small. The same policy reforms also have a major impact on the evolution
of the income distribution. As long as no policies are introduced, inequality rises during
the transition, since the skill premium goes up. Once the policy reform lowers the op-
portunity cost of education, however, the fraction of skilled workers increases over time,
which lowers the skill premium and overall inequality.
Figure 2 shows the simulated path for GDP per capita and the total fertility rate under
the different policies. In the graphs for the Korean and English policies, the Brazilian out-
comes are included (with dashed lines) as the benchmark case to facilitate comparisons.
The time axis is labeled such that each model period corresponds to 25 years, and the
start of the transition to the growth regime is placed in the year 1950 for the Brazilian and
Korean policies, and in 1800 for the English policy. GDP per capita is initially constant,
since the simulation starts in the Malthusian regime where wages are constant. Once the
industrial technology is introduced, incomes start to grow.
The total fertility rate increases slightly before the start of the transition, and then declines
in all simulations. The speed and timing of fertility decline, however, varies across the
simulations. With no reform, fertility decreases only slowly to a total fertility rate of about
3. With an immediate reform, the total fertility rate drops below 3 already at the start of
22the transition, and replacement fertility is reached in less than two generations after the
take-off. The maximum difference in fertility across the Brazilian and Korean simulation
in any year is about 1.5, or about 60% of the maximum difference between Korean and
Brazilian data in Figure 1. Thus, while the model does not account for all of the observed
differential, the effect of the policies is substantial. With the delayed policy reform of the
English simulation, fertility decline starts right after the beginning of the transition as
well, but speeds up after the reforms are carried out (1875 in the simulation). Relative to
the actual English experience, the model with a delayed education reform does a good job
in accounting for the rapid fertility decline around the end of the 19th century. The main
deviation between model and data is that the model not reproduce the initial increase in
fertility between 1700 and 1820 in England, as well as the peak fertility level of about 6.0
in Korea and Brazil. Across all policy options, the maximum fertility level reached in the
simulations is 4.8.
Since fertility and education decisions interact, the same policies that affect the speed of
fertility decline also inﬂuence economic growth in the model. The highest growth rate
is achieved under the Korean policy of an immediate education reform. Under the Ko-
rean policy, the average growth rate of GDP per capita between 1950 and 2000 is 4.2%,
which compares to a growth rate of only 3.3% under the Brazilian Policy. In the data,
we also observe that Korea, as well as other countries with a fast demographic transition,
experienced faster growth in GDP per capita than slow-transition countries like Brazil.
According to the Penn World Tables, the average growth rate in GDP per capita between
1960 and 1990 was 6.7% in Korea, but only 2.8% in Brazil. Even if we consider the shorter
period from 1960 to 1980 (which excludes the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s),
average growth was 6.2% in Korea versus 4.4% in Brazil. The growth rate differential in
the data is larger than the differential in the model, which suggests that social policies and
education decisions are not the only factor explaining the relative performance of Brazil
and Korea. Given that the two countries are different along a number of dimensions, it
would in fact be very surprising if the policies considered here were the main explana-
tion for differences in economic performance. Nevertheless, the results suggest that the
policies and their effects on fertility and education decisions are an important part of the
overall explanation.
The reason for the growth-rate differential in the model is is that with education subsidies
and child-labor restrictions, the skilled fraction of the population increases fast, which
23raises output since the industrial technology is skill-intensive.15 Under the Korean policy,
the fraction of skilled adults in the population increases from 5% in 1950 to almost 70% in
2000. Under the Brazilian policy, the increase is from 5% to only about 33%. In the data,
we observe large differences in average skill between Korea and Brazil as well. In Korea,
average years of schooling of the population aged 25 and over increased from 3.2 in 1960
to 7.8 in 1985. In Brazil, the increase was from 2.6 in 1960 to only 3.5 in 1985. Notice that of
the three channels through which the speed of fertility decline affects GDP per capita only
the human-capital channel is present in the model. This channel captures that because
of the quantity-quality tradeoff, parents increase the education of their children when
fertility falls. The model abstracts from the capital-dilution channel (lower population
growth increases the capital stock per worker) and the cohort-size channel (rapid fertility
decline lowers the dependency ratio). If we extended the model to capture these effects
as well, the predicted growth differential would be even greater.
Apart from inﬂuencing fertility and output, policy changes also affect the income distri-
bution. The graphs on the left-hand side of Figure 3 shows income Gini coefﬁcients for
the simulations. In the model, inequality is determined by the skill premium, which in
turn depends on the relative supply of skilled and unskilled labor. The Korean policy
increases the relative number of skilled adults, which offsets the increased demand for
skilled labor in the industrial sector. Therefore, in the simulation with an immediate pol-
icy reform inequality is generally low and decreases slightly during the transition. The
initial increase in the Gini at the time of the policy reform occurs since the demand for ed-
ucation suddenly increases. This temporarily raises the skill premium, because teachers
are skilled. In the Brazilian simulation unskilled adults continue to make up the majority
of the population. The increased demand for skill in the industry translates into an in-
creased wage premium, so that inequality increases during the transition. With a delayed
policy reform, inequality ﬁrst increases, then decreases during the transition.
Thus only with the English policy do we observe the pronounced inverse-U-shaped rela-
tionship between income and inequality known as the Kuznets curve. In the real world,
this pattern of inequality over the course of development was observed in the countries
that industrialized ﬁrst (Kuznets (1955) looked at England, Germany, and the United
States), but for countries that started to grow more recently the evidence is mixed. Specif-
ically, neither Korea nor Brazil exhibit a Kuznets curve. In Korea inequality was generally
15Because productivity growth is exogenous, the effect on growth rates is transitory, but there is a perma-
nent level effect as long as policies differ.
24low, and there was little change in the income distribution over time. Between 1955 and
1985, the Gini coefﬁcient varies between .3 and .4. In Brazil inequality was always high,
with a Gini between .5 and .6. The income share going to the poorest 20% of the Korean
population is about the same as the share going to the poorest 40% in Brazil. Even consid-
ering that the model abstracts from some features which are relevant for explaining the
income distribution16, the results do show that interactions of public policies with fertility
decisions can have large effects on the growth-inequality relationship. This may provide
an explanation for why Kuznets curves show up in some countries, but not in others.
A more direct test of the distributional implications of the model would look at wage
inequality, and especially the premium for skilled labor, since the skill premium is the
driving force behind changes in inequality in the model. The skill premium reacts to the
policies through the the general-equilibrium effect of education and fertility decisions on
the relative supply of skilled and unskilled labor. Clearly, this general equilibrium effect
is central to the results: fertility falls fast in the Korean simulation precisely because the
policies deliver a low skill premium, which means that education is affordable even for
unskilledparents. Park, Ross, andSabot(1996)compare wageinequalityinBrazilandKo-
rea in 1976 and 1986. Consistent with the predictions of the model, they ﬁnd much higher
skill premia in Brazil than in Korea. Moreover, there is a substantial decline in wage in-
equality in Korea between 1976 and 1986. Speciﬁcally, Park, Ross, and Sabot estimate a
standard earnings equation, i.e., the logarithm of earnings is regressed on education and
work experience. In 1976, high school graduates in Brazil earned a 60 percent premium
relative to workers who ﬁnished primary school, while the premium was only 35 percent
in Korea. For university graduates, the premium (relative to primary school) was 201
percent in Brazil versus 121 percent in Korea. In 1986, the differences were even more
pronounced. In Brazil, the premia for high school and university graduates were still 55
and 188 percent, respectively, while in Korea the premia had fallen to just 10 percent and
76 percent.
In the model, changes in overall fertility are driven by differences in fertility between
skilled and unskilled parents. The graphs on the right-hand side of Figure 3 break down
the total fertility rate in each simulation by the type of the parent. In the Brazilian simu-
lation there are no education subsidies or child-labor restrictions. Unskilled children are
16For the comparison of Brazil and Korea, the role of land ownership is essential. After a land reform at
the end of Japanese occupation, land ownership was dispersed in Korea, but always highly concentrated
in Brazil. Indeed, if concentrated land ownership is introduced, the model generates high inequality with
almost no time trend under the Brazilian policy.
25cheap relative to skilled children, and therefore unskilled parents continue to have many
children throughout the transition. Initially, average fertility increases for both groups
of parents, and the aggregate total fertility rate falls only because skilled adults begin to
make up a larger fraction of the population. The fertility differential between skilled and
unskilled parents stays large. Under the Korean policy, the fertility differential between
the two types of parents declines rapidly after the policy change. The abolition of child la-
bor and education subsidies imply that skilled children are only slightly more expensive
than unskilled children, which results is a small fertility differential between skilled and
unskilled parents. The same effect occurs in the English simulation after the new policies
are introduced.
In the data, in line with the predictions, the available evidence shows small fertility dif-
ferentials in Korea and large differentials in Brazil. According to United Nations (1995),
in 1986 Brazilian women without formal education had a total fertility rate of 6.7, while
for women with seven or more years of education the number is 2.4. Thus the fertility
differential amounts to more than four children. Alam and Casterline (1984) report that
in 1974 the total fertility rate for Korean women without formal education was 5.7, while
for women with seven or more years of education the rate is 3.4. This gives a fertility
differential of 2.3, roughly half of the differential in Brazil.17 England, as well as other
industrialized countries, has small fertility differentials within the population today in
comparison to developing countries.
In summary, we see that the policies considered have large effects on fertility decline dur-
ing the transition to growth. These differences translate into further implications for GDP
per capita, average education levels, fertility differentials, and the income distribution
which line up well with the evidence for our examples Brazil and Korea. So far the analy-
sis of public policy was restricted to a combination of two policies, an education subsidy
and child-labor restrictions. A natural question to ask is which of the two policies is more
important for generating the results described above. It turns out that the child-labor re-
striction has a much bigger impact than the education subsidy. Figure 4 shows outcomes
for GDP per capita and fertility if either education subsidies or child labor restrictions
are introduced in isolation. If only a child-labor restriction is introduced, the evolution
of income per capita and fertility is similar to the Korean simulation, which introduces
both policies. With a child-labor restriction there is an unambiguous increase in the cost
17Unfortunately, there is no data for Brazil and Korea for the same year. However, given the overall fall
in fertility, it seems likely that the fertility differential by education in Korea was even lower in 1986 than in
1974.
26of unskilled children, which reduces fertility even faster compared to the case when both
policies are combined. In contrast, when there is only an education subsidy, fertility ac-
tually increases initially, and the subsequent decline is much smaller than in the Korean
simulation. The reason is that the education subsidy works in two different ways. Since
skilled children become cheaper, more unskilled parents decide to educate their children,
which lowers fertility. At the same time, however, fertility increases for the skilled par-
ents who would have decided to educate their children even without the subsidy. The
two effects are partially offsetting, and the overall impact is small. These results under-
line the importance of including the cost of the children’s time in the opportunity cost
of education. In fact, if we did not account for the cost of the children’s time, it would
be rather surprising that in England fertility fell fastest just at the time when free public
education was introduced.
A welfare analysis of the policies is made difﬁcult by the fact that skilled and unskilled
people have opposing interests. Therefore the policies cannot be ranked using the Pareto
criterion. The education subsidy, however, is beneﬁcial for adults of both skills in the
period when the subsidy is introduced. Future generations of skilled people have lower
utility with the policy because of a lower skill premium. A child-labor restriction alone
hurts both skills in the period when it is introduced, since the unskilled parents lose in-
come, and the utility of skilled children falls. However, future generations of unskilled
people beneﬁt from child-labor restrictions. A combination of the two policies yields the
highest growth path for GDP per capita, but future skilled generations are still better off
without the policies.
7 Conclusions
This paper develops a theory that is consistent with a phase of stagnation during which
the economy exhibits Malthusian features, followed by a transition to a growth regime.
Theeconomic transition to growth is accompaniedby ademographic transition from high
to low fertility. The model is used to assess whether child-labor restrictions and education
subsidies can have large impacts on the fertility decline that accompanies the transition
to growth.
The possibility of child labor implies that the value of a child’s time becomes part of the
27opportunity cost of education.18 Without accounting for the value of the children’s time,
it would be very puzzling that in many countries fertility fell fastest just at the time when
free public education was introduced. When there is no alternative use for a child’s time,
free education lowers the cost of children and therefore should lead to higher fertility. In
contrast, once we account for the full opportunity cost of education including potential
child labor income, educating a child is costly even if schools are free. A steep decline in
fertility right after major education reforms is therefore just what we should expect to see.
Indeed, we ﬁnd that education and child labor policies have large effects on the fertility
transition. The policies also determine the evolution of income per capita, average edu-
cation, and the income distribution of a country during the transition to growth. When
comparing the two policies, the effects of education subsidies are relatively small, while
accounting for child-labor regulations is crucial.
The results show that accounting for policy changes is important for understanding the
experience of different countries during the transition from stagnation to growth. This
ﬁnding does not rule out that other factors could play an important role as well. For ex-
ample, the model abstracts from changes in mortality rates, even though declining mor-
tality is an equally important aspect of the demographic transition as declining fertility.
As a simple extension to the model, changes in child mortality can be incorporated by
introducing a probability of survival until adulthood. In the calibrated model, for small
increases in child mortality the number of births increases, but the number of surviv-
ing children declines. Feeding realistic survival rates into the model makes it possible to
match actual fertility numbers more closely, but the effects of policy changes are still the
same and dominate the effects of changing child mortality.19 In order to incorporate adult
mortality, the framework would have to be extended to allow for more than two periods
of life.
Another question is how the stylized policies in the model are implemented in the real
world. Child-labor regulations are subject to an obvious enforcement problem, which is
severe given that much child labor takes place in agriculture, where direct supervision is
difﬁcult. A number of studies have found that ofﬁcial child-labor restrictions do little to
constrain child labor. In practice, compulsory schooling laws often appear to be a more
18The role of child labor in determining fertility has been analyzed by Rosenzweig and Evenson (1980).
In line with the results here, they ﬁnd that the economic contributions of children through child labor are
an important determinant for fertility rates.
19Within the dynastic utility framework, changes in child mortality rates have only minor effects on
fertility even if stochastic survival and sequential fertility choice are taken into account, see Doepke (2002).
28effective constraint on child labor than direct regulation.20 From an administrative point
of view, it is easier to check that children sh o wu pi nag i v e nc l a s s r o o ma tac e r t a i nt i m e ,
as opposed to ascertaining that they do not engage in illegal work at any time and any
place. Therefore, even though the policies can be used separately in the model, they are
best thought of as a joint policy in practice.
In the discussion of the transition from stagnation to growth I concentrated on cross-
country differences in the fertility decline. An important question that is not addressed
in this paper is why the take-off occurs at different times in different countries. The gov-
ernment policies that are discussed in this paper have the potential to cause a delay in
the take-off of about 10 to 20 years, which is clearly too little to explain the observed dif-
ferences. In order to make progress along this line, it will be necessary to move beyond
the assumption of exogenous productivity growth and introduce a theory of technologi-
cal progress. The results in this paper do not depend in any way on the assumption that
productivity growth is exogenous. As a ﬁrst step beyond exogenous growth, it is possible
to link the rate of technological progress to the number of skilled people in the economy.
Such a model can explain why the rate of economic growth increased during the indus-
trial revolution, instead of jumping to the growth-regime level right away. The effects of
government policies on growth would be ampliﬁed.
Going beyond the speciﬁc application to fertility decline, this paper contributes to an
emerging literature which puts the spotlight on the role of policy reforms in the course
of development. Every now industrialized country has introduced child labor and public
education laws at a certain stage of development. The same is true about other policies
such as social insurance programs. While the research in this paper suggests that policy
reforms can have large effects on fertility decisions, an intriguing possibility for future
research would be to examine the reverse channel. If family size is dependent on educa-
tional policies, conversely voters’ preferences over such policies should depend at least
partly on their earlier fertility decisions. This suggests the possibility of a two-way in-
teraction between the demographic changes and the political reforms that characterize
economies during the transition from stagnation to growth.
20For example, using U.S. data, Margo and Finegan (1996) ﬁnd that child-labor restrictions are especially
effective if combined with compulsory schooling laws.
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A Deﬁnition of an Equilibrium
This section introduces the remaining equilibrium conditions, starting with the determi-
nation of labor supply. Skilled adults distribute their time between working, raising and
teaching their own children, and teaching children of unskilled parents. Therefore the
total supply of skilled labor LS is given by:
LS(x)= [ 1− (φ + φS) λS→S(x) nS(S,x) − φλ S→U(x) nU(S,x)] NS
− φS λU→S(x) nS(U,x) NU. (16)
Unskilled labor LU is supplied by unskilled adults and by children who do not go to
school:
LU(x)= [ 1− φλ U→S(x) nS(U,x) − φλ U→U(x) nU(U,x)] NU
+ φU(x)[ λS→U(x) nU(S,x) NS + λU→U(x) nU(U,x) NU]. (17)
In equilibrium, labor supply has to equal labor demand for each type of labor. I assume
that skilled adults can perform both the skilled and the unskilled work, while unskilled
adults can do unskilled work only. Under this assumption, the skilled wage cannot fall
below the unskilled wage:
wS(x) ≥ wU(x). (18)
The market-clearing conditions for the labor market are:
LFS(x)+LIS(x) ≤LS(x), =i f wS(x) >w U(x), (19)
LFU(x)+LIU(x)= LU(x)+[LS(x) − LFS(x) − LIS(x)]. (20)
32The ﬂat tax τ which ﬁnances the education subsidy has to be chosen to observe budget
balance. The correct tax rate is given by dividing the total expenditure on schooling sub-
sidies by total wage income:
τ(x)=
δ(x) φS N 
S wS(x)




S is the total number of skilled children. Notice that for the computation of total
l a b o ri n c o m ew eh a v et oa d dt h ei n c o m eo ft h et e a c h e r st ot h ew a g eo ft h eu s u a lw o r k e r s .
Teachers receive wages for their work and are taxed like all other adults in the model
economy.
The ﬁnal equilibrium condition is the law of motion for population. Since I abstract from
child mortality, the number of adults of a given type tomorrow is given by the number of
children of that type today:
N
 
S =λS→S(x) nS(S,x) NS + λU→S(x) nS(U,x) NU, (22)
N
 
U =λS→U(x) nU(S,x) NS + λU→U(x) nU(U,x) NU. (23)
We now have all the ingredients at hand that are needed to deﬁne an equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium) Given a government policy {φU,δ},a
recursive competitive equilibrium consists of a tax function τ, value functions VS and VU, labor
supply functions LS and LU, labor demand functions LFS, LFU, LIS,a n dLIU, wage functions
wS and wU, mobility functions λS→S, λS→U, λU→S,a n dλU→U, all mapping X into R+, policy
functions nS and nU mapping {S,U}×X into R+, and a law of motion g mapping X into itself,
such that:
(i) The value functions satisfy the following functional equation for i ∈{ S,U}:











subject to the budget constraint (9) and the law of motion x  = g(x).
(ii) For i,j ∈{ S,U},i fλi→j(x) > 0, nj(i,x) attains the maximum in (24).
(iii) The tax function τ satisﬁes the government budget constraint (21).
(iv) The wages wS and wU and labor demand LFS, LFU, LIS,a n dLIU satisfy (5)–(8) and (18).
(v) Labor supply LS and LU satisﬁes (16) and (17).
(vi) Labor supply LS and LU and labor demand LFS, LFU, LIS,a n dLIU satisfy (19) and (20).
(vii) The mobility functions λS→S, λS→U, λU→S,a n dλU→U satisfy (10).
33(viii) The law of motion g f o rt h es t a t ev a r i a b l ex is given by (4), (22),a n d(23).
Theequilibriumconditions donotincludeamarket-clearing constraint forthe goodsmar-
ket, because it holds automatically by Walras’ Law. In condition (ii) above, it is under-
stood that parents choose only one type of children. In other words, saying that nS(S,x)
attains the maximum in (24) means that {nS = nS(S,x), nU =0 } and the consumption c
that results from the budget constraint maximize utility. Maximization is only required
if a positive number of parents choose the type of children in question. Condition (iii)
is the government budget constraint. Condition (iv) requires that wages equal marginal
products and that the skilled wage does not fall below the unskilled wage, condition (v)
links labor supply to population and education time, condition (vi) is the market-clearing
condition for the labor market, condition (vii) requires that for each type of adult the frac-
tions having skilled and unskilled children sum to one, and condition (viii) deﬁnes the
law of motion.
B Proofs for all Propositions







α − wS(x) lS − wU(x) lU

. (25)






Plugging this expression back into (25) yields a formulation of the proﬁt maximization












lU − wU(x) lU

. (26)
Since this expression is linear in lU, production in the industrial sector will be proﬁtable









− wU(x) ≥ 0,
which can be rearranged to get:
wS(x)
1−α wU(x)




34The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for a maximum of the proﬁt-maximization problem























Since the objective function is concave, the ﬁrst-order conditions are also sufﬁcient for a
maximum. It is therefore sufﬁcient to show that for any wS(x),w U(x) > 0w ec a nﬁ n d
values for skilled and unskilled labor supply LFS and LFU such that (27) and (28) are




































which are positive for any positive wages wS(x)a n dwU(x). 






1− (f/pS +( 1− f)/pU)
− [fVS/pS +( 1− f)VU/pU]

.
By assumption, the parameters β, σ and   are all strictly bigger than zero and strictly
smaller than one. It is also assumed w.l.o.g. that 0 <p U <p S and VS,V U ≥ 0h o l d .W e
want to show that there are no interior solutions in f, i.e., if there is a solution to the
maximization problem above, the optimal f is either zero or one.
To show that there are no interior solutions, assume that we have already determined
the optimal E. Given this E and the fact that the function to be maximized is twice
continuously differentiable in f, if there were an interior solution, the optimal f would
have to satisfy ﬁrst- and second-order conditions for a maximum. I solve for the unique
f which solves the ﬁrst-order condition, and show that this f does not satisfy the second-
order condition. This proves that there are only corner solutions.


























































































In the ﬁrst derivative, for 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, the ﬁrst term within the outer brackets is positive.
For an interior solution to be possible, it has to be the case that VS/pS <V U/pU,b e c a u s e
otherwise the secondterm isalsopositive andtheﬁrst-order condition cannotbesatisﬁed.
Therefore if VS/pS ≥ VU/pU,w ea r ed o n e .F o rt h ec a s et h a tVS/pS <V U/pU, setting the



























I will now plug this value for f into the second derivative to verify that the second deriva-
tive is positive, so that the critical point is not a maximum. The second derivative is
positive if the following inequality holds:





























Plugging in our value for f yields after some algebra:































































Thus if VS >V U the second-order condition for a maximum is not satisﬁed, and therefore
there is no interior maximum. Conversely, if VS were smaller than VU,t h e r ew o u l db e
only unskilled children for sure, since they are cheaper to educate. Thus once again we
obtain a corner solution. Thus in every case there are only corner solutions. families have
36either unskilled or skilled children, but they do not mix. 
Proof of Proposition 3 It is helpful to consider the formulation of the problem in which
adults choose the total education cost E, so that the number of children equals E/pi for




















Since the costs and utilities of children enter only in the last term, an adult is indifferent





Notice thatthis condition does not dependon the wageof theadult. Also, if condition (31)
is satisﬁed, adults face the same maximization problem regardless whether they decide
for unskilled or skilled children. This implies that the optimal total education cost E does
not depend on the type of the children. The higher cost of having skilled children will be
exactly made up by a lower number of children. 
Proof of Proposition 4 Since we assume wS >w U, i.e., the skilled wage strictly exceeds
the unskilled wage, the time of skilled parents is more expensive. We then have:
φwS + φSwS + ρ
φwS − φUwU + ρ
<
φwU + φSwS + ρ
φwU − φUwU + ρ
,
the ratio of the total cost of skilled child to that an unskilled child is lower for skilled par-
ents than for unskilled parents. In other words, skilled children are relatively cheaper for
skilled parents, and unskilled children are relatively cheaper for unskilled parents. Since
in equilibrium there must be a positive number of children of each type, at least some
skilled parents must have skilled children, and at least some unskilled parents must have
unskilled children. Moreover, it follows from Proposition 3 that both types of parents can
be indifferent between both types of children only if the price ratio between skilled and
unskilled children is the same. This cannot be the case since the wage and therefore the
time cost differs, thus just one type of parent can be indifferent. 
37C Policies in Brazil, Korea, and England
Korea and Brazil are polar cases in terms educational and child-labor policies. Korea in-
stituted a system of free, compulsory education from the ages of 6 to 12 in 1949, right
after independence. After the Korean war the government instituted a ‘Compulsory Ed-
ucation Accomplishment Plan,” and by 1959 the primary enrollment rate reached 96%.
Strictly enforced compulsory education served as an effective constraint on child labor, in
addition to direct child-labor restrictions. According to the International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO), in 1960 only 1.1% of the children from zero to ﬁfteen years were economically
active, and by 1985 only .3% of the children between ages ten and fourteen participated in
the labor market. By the letter of the law, free and compulsory education was introduced
in Brazil already in 1930. In practice, however, primary schooling was not available in
many rural areas, and to the present day the available schools are often of poor quality.
In 1965 the primary enrollment rate was still below 50% in rural areas. The neglect of
primary education in Brazil can also be gauged from education ﬁnances. In 1960, less
than 10% of public spending on education was directed to the primary sector, while the
corresponding ﬁgure was about 70% for Korea. Child-labor regulation is less restrictive
in Brazil in Korea. While Korea signed on to an ILO convention that rules out child la-
bor under the age of 14, Brazil did not. The minimum age for employment in Brazil is
now 12, and even this limit is not always enforced. In 1985 18.7% of the children between
ages ten and fourteen participated in the labor market. Child labor is even more preva-
lent among male children, with 25.3% listed as economically active in 1987. The different
policies in Brazil and Korea are also reﬂected in educational outcomes. In both countries
average years of schooling increase over time, but the increase is much faster in Korea.
In 1960, the difference in average years of schooling between Korea and Brazil was less
than a year. By 1985, the difference increased to more than four years, so that Koreans
on average have more than twice as much schooling as Brazilians. Another measure of
educational success is given by adult illiteracy rates. In 1960, 39% of adult Brazilians were
illiterate, compared to 29% of adult Koreans. In 1995, in Brazil illiteracy is still at 16.7%,
while Koreans are almost completely literate with an illiteracy rate of only 2%. In Brazil
illiteracy is high even among groups who went to school only recently. In 1991, illiteracy
was 12.1% for the age group from 15 to 19 years.
In England, education was not widespread at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.
In 1780, only about 50% of brides and grooms were able to sign their name. Education
expanded only slowly throughout most of the nineteenth century. Public education also
started to expand in the nineteenth century, but there were large regional differences and
no universal access to affordable education. The situation changed drastically with the
Victorian education reforms. The Forster Education Actof 1870 placed primary education
under public control. In 1880 compulsory schooling was introduced, and starting in 1891
primary education was free. While schooling quality is hard to measure, literacy data
suggests that the reforms were successful. While in 1880 about 15% of grooms and 20%
of brides were unable to sign their name, these numbers decreased to less than 2% until
381910. The ﬁrst child-laborrestrictions were put in place with the Factory Actof 1833. Only
a small set of industries was affected, however, and Nardinelli (1980) concludes that the
impact on child labor was small. The Factory Acts were amended in 1844 and 1874, when
the minimum age for child laborers was raised to 10. At that time the restrictions became
universal, instead of being limited to certain industries. Compulsory schooling laws also
had an effect on child labor. As a result, the incidence of child labor was decreasing late
in the nineteenth century. Activity rates for children aged from ten to fourteen reached a
peak 1861, when 29% of all children in that age group were economically active. In 1871,
the number was still at 26%, but then it fell to about 20% in 1881 and 1891, 17% in 1901,
and 14% in 1911.
D Notes on Computation
Within the Malthusian regime and the growth regime, the model can be computed via
standard value function iteration on a discretized state space. The initial guess for the
value functions is computed by setting the number of children to zero, so that utility
stems from consumption only. During the iterations, for a given state x,t h ea l g o r i t h m
ﬁnds a state x  in the next period such that the resulting fertility decisions of adults are
consistent with state x . After the iterations converge, the equilibrium law of motion can
be used to compute steady-state values. Alternatively, the steady state can be computed
by solving a system of equations that deﬁnes the steady state.
In principle it is possible to compute the entire model, encompassing the Malthusian
regime, the transition, and the growth regime, with the same method described above.
However, since the state vector is four-dimensional, computations would either take very
long or would be imprecise. Therefore I use a shooting algorithm that directly computes
the equilibrium path over T periods from any starting value x0 for the state vector. The
computations are started a number of periods before the industrial technology becomes
competitive. The number of periods T to be computed has to be chosen sufﬁciently large
such that the economy is close to the balanced growth path at T. Whether this is the case
can be checked by computing the growth regime as described above before computing
the transition. The algorithm is not guaranteed to converge, but it works well in practice.


















The graph covers approximately the periods 1820-1914 for Eng-
land, 1945 to 1980 for Brazil, and 1960 to 1985 for Korea.
Figure 1: Fertility Decline from Peak Relative to GDP per capita in Brazil, Korea, and
England
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Figure 2: Outcome with Different Policies (Dotted Lines are Brazilian Outcomes as a
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Figure 3: Gini Coefﬁcients and Fertility Differentials


















































Figure 4: Outcome with Isolated Policies